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Resource-constrained devices are commonly connected to a network and become 
“things” that make up the Internet of Things (IoT). Many industries are interested in cost-
effective, reliable, and cyber secure sensor networks due to the ever-increasing 
connectivity and benefits of IoT devices. The full advantages of IoT devices are seen in a 
long-range and remote context. However, current IoT platforms show many obstacles to 
achieve a balance between power efficiency and cybersecurity. Battery-powered sensor 
nodes can reliably send data over long distances with minimal power draw by adopting 
Long-Range (LoRa) wireless radio frequency technology. With LoRa, these devices can 
stay active for many years due to a low data bit rate and low power draw during device 
sleep states. An improvement built on top of LoRa wireless technology, Long-Range 
Wide Area Networks (LoRaWAN), introduces integrity and confidentiality yet, protocol 
and implementation vulnerabilities still exist within the network, resulting in security 
risks to the whole system. In this research, solutions to these vulnerabilities are proposed 
and implemented on a LoRaWAN testbed environment that contains devices, gateways, 
and servers. Configurations that involve the transmission of data using AES Round 
Reduction, Join Scheduling, and Metadata Hiding are proposed in this work. A power 
consumption analysis is performed on the implemented configurations, resulting in a 
LoRaWAN system that balances cybersecurity and battery life.  
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1.1 Background  
Wireless technologies are continually evolving and improving device 
connectivity, power efficiency, design flexibility, and cost reduction [1]. The 
interconnection of devices that can relay information to other devices and even trigger 
software-based events is a technology that has seemingly endless opportunities. The 
world’s growing dependency on devices known as “things,” which are physical devices 
that are constantly connecting and exchanging information with each other, is undeniable. 
These “things” are part of a subset of devices connected to the internet and make up the 
Internet of Things [2].   
The Internet of Things (IoT) is a connected network of devices that includes 
sensors, wearable devices, smartphones, and many other types of sensors that send and 
receive data from the internet. The usefulness and need for data acquisition have been 
ingrained into our society, commerce, and daily lives. Figure 1 below shows that 
according to Statistica, the total number of IoT connected devices will reach around 75 
billion by 2025 [3]. Society has become reliant on wireless devices to improve quality of 
life, and the industries are dependent on more efficient and interconnected technology to 
improve overall system functions. IoT devices typically gather and send information to 
remote servers, allowing the analysis of that data and improving organizational operation. 




Figure 1. IoT Connected Devices From 2015 to 2025 [3] 
 
To improve these wireless connections, many unique types of hardware and 
software solutions exist. Long-Range Low-Power wireless devices focus on providing 
sensor information from one remote device to a remote gateway. The data is routed to a 
network and application server from the gateway, where the data can be used fittingly. 
These devices belong to a type of wireless telecommunications known as Low-Power-
Wide-Area-Networks (LPWAN). LPWAN’s are a low-power network that contains 
devices that transmit data over a long distance with low data rate and low bandwidth. 
This technology's core fundamentals are low power consumption, low transceiver chip 
cost, and an extensive coverage area [4].  
These wide-area networks are considered low-powered because the devices 
involved are not powered by a mains power source but rather a battery.  For the devices 
to send data over a long period, the data bitrate (the number of bits over time) is reduced, 
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and therefore, the power consumption over time is reduced. Low power consumption 
results in the ability to set up these devices in remote areas and trust that the overall 
battery life can be as long as multiple months or even numerous years. A ten-year battery 
life due to the low data rate and careful selection of parameter configurations and duty 
cycling is possible [5]. Real-world results will vary and most likely will be lower than 
that rate depending on frequency, microcontroller hardware, firmware, and software. An 
important radio frequency modulation scheme that will focus on the experiment phase is 
LoRa, or “Long-Range.”  
1.2 Problem Statement 
External microcontrollers are increasingly being connected to the internet, and 
unfortunately, with this expanded functionality, security has been given a lower priority 
than connectivity [6]. When data is transferred between multiple devices or systems, each 
step requires a layer of protection. Protection includes the prevention of alteration of data 
or unauthorized access by attackers who do not have permissions to access the various 
resources [5]. The attack surface, or the vector in which inputs can be provided, include 
the physical device itself, networking hardware, servers, and other remote network 
resources. 
         The prevention of cyber-attacks and detection and response is critical to ensure a 
system is cyber secure. To deem a system secure, the following information security 
tenants must be satisfied. Confidentiality of information means that data should never be 
disclosed to unauthorized parties [7]. The integrity of information is defined as data that 
should never be modified by those who cannot change it. Availability of data is defined 
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as the assurance that data is accessible when the user requests it. Authentication, 
particularly mutual authentication, in an IoT context is a verification of identity 
commonly seen when IoT devices join a network. Nonrepudiation is the assurance that 
actions such as join procedures, activation, and data transmission can be traced back to 
the device doing the operation, and these actions are commonly logged by IoT servers 
[7]. 
           Since LPWAN transmits data over a public unlicensed radio frequency band, it is 
essential to ensure the data's confidentiality. Confidentiality could be achieved through 
encryption but comes with the drawback of increased energy consumption and a shorter 
availability of the device [8]. It may not be feasible to replace the battery of sensor nodes 
as they can be deployed in hard to reach or even potentially unsafe environments. It follows 
with such a device’s battery life must also be prioritized. 
 As with physical access to any device, there is an inherent threat to this 
technology's security. This flaw is due to the portability and accessibility of the devices, 
which may grant the ability to retrieve the devices' credentials. Protection of the keys and 
ensuring that installing these devices results in a secure system is paramount [9]. The 
options to secure a device must be analyzed. Solutions must be offered to ensure a greater 
level of physical security and less associated risk for provisioning devices in settings such 
as city rooftops, parking garages, streets, and more. 
 The first purpose of this work is to examine the security posture of a subset of 
LPWAN devices, called LoRaWAN devices. The distinction between these types of 
devices will be made in Chapter 2 of this work. The second purpose is to evaluate the power 
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expenditure of LoRaWAN devices within a testbed environment.  The testbed will be used 
to find a set of optimal software changes to the LoRaWAN devices. The third purpose is 
to improve the security of the LoRaWAN devices and show that the changes are valid by 
analyzing the overall battery consumption, battery life, and device availability. The result 
is to propose a set of changes to the LoRaWAN protocol that will help strike a balance 
between cybersecurity and battery life.  
1.3 Strategy and Approach 
This section details background information is critical to the topics that will be 
addressed in the experimental phase of this work. To become familiar with and test the 
hardware, software, firmware, and protocols: a LoRaWAN testbed was created. The 
testbed contains a network of portable devices, concentrators, and servers and is 
described in detail. The goal of the testbed is to test improvements to a real-world 
application of a LoRaWAN network. 
Due to a LoRaWAN network's modularity, the testbed itself is modular and many 
future improvements to the LoRaWAN protocol can be tested. This work's experiment 
phase is an iterative look at the power expenditure and security posture when utilizing 
various existing and newly proposed configurations. Power and current measurements 
were gathered from multiple types of LoRaWAN devices from a power monitor. A 
statistical analysis is performed from the data collected to discover an optimal 
configuration for a LoRaWAN device that balances both security and availability. This 
work will address security issues on the theoretical side as well as the experimental side. 
Conclusions on what changes to LoRaWAN systems will be made. The conclusions are 
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found by analyzing real power data and the theoretical framework of the LoRaWAN 
protocol. 
1.4 Assumptions 
 A few assumptions about the environment must be considered when devising a 
LoRaWAN testbed. The first assumption is that the devices used to test the protocols may 
not be the most energy-efficient devices. The tradeoff here is the ease of customization 
and configuration of the hardware, firmware, and software. Next, there may be a loss of 
accuracy with battery calculations over more extended periods. The equations are a 
guideline of how long the battery should last rather than will last. Lastly, there may be a 
margin of error within real-world data points as environmental factors, and quality factors 
such as the real-world reliability, availability, and maintainability of the end nodes are 













Chapter 2 outlines the LoRa and LoRaWAN specification and details the relevant 
information critical to keeping this long-range, low-power technology secure. The 
behavior of various settings and implementations are evaluated, and the importance to the 
security vs. battery life problem is considered. The primary source of information for 
sections 2.4 and 2.5 that outlines the LoRaWAN protocol is from the LoRa Alliance 
LoRaWAN Specification v1.0.2 document [10].  
2.1 LoRa Background 
LoRa (Long Range) is a patented radio frequency modulation scheme derived 
from chirp spread spectrum modulation to transmit radio signals.  LoRa’s name is an 
acronym for “long-range,” which accurately expresses this technology's core 
functionality and purpose. The LoRa protocol, which has been acquired by the 
communications company Semtech, is commonly used to send sensor data via radio 
waves from an IoT device or sensor to a gateway/concentrator. This technology is 
agnostic from the higher Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model layers, allowing 
interoperability with existing or new network architectures. The radio module has 
regulatory approval to operate in the 868 and 915 MHz industrial, scientific, and medical 
(ISM) spectrum [11]. 
As acknowledged, long-range is an important feature, yet other essential features 
include low-data transfer rate, low-power, and low-cost [11]. Semtech brand LoRa 
modules are available for only a few dollars online, with complete controllers available 
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for a few times the chip price. There are estimates that the battery life of these devices is 
up to 10 years, depending on the hardware involved. The typical range of LoRa devices is 
up to 10km, yet it relies heavily on the surrounding environment, power mode, antenna 
quality, and more. In 2019 a transmission distance of 766 km (476 miles) was reached by 
a LoRa module connected to a balloon, as shown in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2. Map Depicting Longest Distance a LoRa Frame Was Received [19] 
 
The required amount of data sent over time is assumed to be relatively low if 
these devices are chosen. There are many use cases in which this is appropriate, be it 
periodic data transmission or reactions to events. Low power consumption is achieved 
with small amounts of bit data sent through short radio transmissions followed by a sleep 
cycle to conserve battery life. The remaining core functionality is low-cost, which is 
possible because of the inexpensive manufacturing of transceivers and the inexpensive 
microprocessors required to process the sensor's data. 
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2.2 LoRa Physical Layer Specifications 
As seen in Figure 3 below, LP-WAN (sic) devices have a longer maximum 
communication distance than Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, and NFC [12]. Cellular data is best for 
high baud rates and long distances than LoRa, but it is met with a higher overall cost due 
to the need for a SIM card for each device, subject to internet service provider rates. 
LoRa is one of the best and most cost-effective alternatives if small amounts of data over 
time is warranted. If there are no Wi-Fi access points in range and years of battery life is 
required, LoRa would be a desirable communication protocol. Outdoor, where local area 
networks are limited, the full benefits of this technology can be seen.  
 
 
Figure 3. Energy Efficiency vs. Data Rate and Coverage Range [11] 
 
        LoRa is a low-power communication protocol due to the LoRa physical layer, or 
the LoRa PHY.  The LoRa PHY is defined as the radio interface that creates the bits from 
spread spectrum modulation. The physical layer communication performance is 
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customizable with bandwidth, coding rate, and spreading factor. As far as LoRa, there are 
various bands that these devices can communicate with depending on their deployed 
country. Radio frequency modules are provisioned with a specific carrier frequency by 
region, and the chip and antenna are manufactured and transmit on the same band (915 
MHz for North America) [13].  Table 1 below shows that the adjustable settings that 
impact the performance of LoRa communications are outlined [14].  
 
Table 1 
LoRa North America Regional Specification Summary 
Setting Values Description 
Carrier 
Frequency 
915 MHz Operating Frequency used by Semtech SX1276 chips. 
Bandwidth 125...500kHz Higher bandwidths increase data rates but reduce 
receiver sensitivity and range. 
Spreading 
Factor 
7-12 Higher spreading factors increase radio signal 
sensitivity and larger packets. 
Coding Rate 4/5 . . . 4/8 A higher coding rate increases resilience to interference 




+30dBm Not recommended to change, increasing power 
immensely affects battery life. 




2.3 LoRaWAN Network Architecture 
As an improvement of LoRa, LoRaWAN was developed to add confidentiality of 
data, the integrity of the frames being sent, and availability to LoRa end nodes. 
LoRaWAN gateways, also known as concentrators, receive the radio transmissions from 
the LoRa end nodes. LoRaWAN is a MAC protocol that defines the network architecture 
and communication protocol to send data from LoRa radio frequency modules securely. 
The expected battery life of LoRaWAN nodes is decreased due to the overhead of 
securing the payload and the activating of devices.  
There are several core components of a LoRaWAN network that make it useful. A 
wide range of configurations and settings available because the network is designed as a 
“Star of Stars” network topology [15]. Each component has a wide array of functionality 
that can meet the consumer’s needs. As seen below in Figure 4, there are four main 






Figure 4. LoRaWAN Network Architecture [22] 
 
        LoRaWAN end nodes, or end devices, are microcontroller units that contain LoRa 
radio frequency transceivers and sensors. The transceivers are optimized for low current 
consumption and high interference resistance. These devices have an overall low cost 
because the radio frequency modules use an inexpensive crystal oscillator. End nodes are 
also portable, easy to provision, and available with commercial off the shelf technology. 
Many open-source platforms allow the framework's customization to test the interaction 
between the microcontroller and the transceiver code. Gateways collect the radio 
frequency transmissions from end nodes. Before a packet is sent to the gateway, the data 
field is encrypted by an AppSKey, and the Message Integrity Code (MIC) is generated by 
a Network Session Key (NwkSKey) [10]. 
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        Gateways, or concentrators, are devices that allow networking operations and, in 
this case, act as LoRaWAN base stations and even sensor nodes. The gateways enable 
large scale deployment of end nodes and have a wide range of flexibility and 
customization options. Gateways that are not connected to the internet can act as beacons 
to relay end node data to another internet-connected gateway. Gateways typically offer 
multiple backhaul options such as Wi-Fi, LTE, and Ethernet as well as built-in GPS 
modules to keep track of remote gateways. A gateway is managed by and sends data to a 
network server located in the cloud, or if a gateway-embedded network server is in use, 
directly to that local network server [10]. 
        Network Servers provide the security and scalability of the LoRaWAN network. 
Network Servers provide integrity checks of each message via the MIC. When similar 
payloads are sent, the MIC changes because the frame counter is incremented in each 
following message. The NwkSKey is provided to the end node and network server upon 
activation.  The network server uses the NwkSKey and the AES-CMAC algorithm to 
compute the MIC from the frame [8][10]. If the MIC calculated matches the MIC 
attached to the frame, the integrity of the payload is intact. If the message was altered, 
then the MIC would change, meaning that it may not be from a known source or 
modified in transit. The network server can send messages downlink to the end node and 
interface uplink with the application server. Most application servers provide a network 
management interface to adjust parameters and settings. Network servers also interact 




 Application Servers allow the decrypting of application payloads to store, collect, 
or visualize the incoming data. Much like the network server uses a NetSKey, the 
application server has an AppSKey, yet it uses AES-128 CTR mode to decrypt the data 
[8]. Typically, an application server has a web-interface that allows the devices, users, 
and services to be configured, and a RESTful API is exposed to gather the data [27][29]. 
Application servers can retrieve the state of the gateway to see if it is up, show gateway 
location, and show real-time logs of live frames or events coming into the server [10]. 
2.4 LoRaWAN Protocol Stack 
The LoRaWAN Protocol stack in Figure 5 shows the hierarchy between the MAC 
and physical layer. Starting from the bottom up, the Physical Layer defines the Regional 
ISM Band, which outlines the allotted frequency bands for the US, EU, AS, KR, and 
other geographical regions. The LoRa Modulation Layer contains the radio and 
modulation standards, with software, hardware, and radio frequency regulations. This 
LoRa layer deals explicitly with the bit layer implementation of the radio frequency. 
Next, the MAC layer is simply the media access control layer that the LoRaWAN 
protocol adds to the system. The primary purpose of a LoRaWAN node is to transmit 
Application Layer data to the medium to collect and visualize the data. In this layer, 
security is essential to ensure the network operator has no access to the application data. 
Each layer has specific functionality and standards to ensure that the protocol operates as 






Figure 5. LoRaWAN Protocol Stack [10] 
 
In Figure 6 below, The LoRaWAN message format is displayed. The Physical 
Layer of the Payload seats the Preamble, PHY Header, PHY Header CRC, PHY Payload, 
and CRC. The LoRaWAN aspect of the message is nested inside of the PHY Payload 
within the physical layer. Within the network layer, there is the MAC Header, MAC 
Payload, and Message Integrity code. The MAC payload contains application layer data: 
A Frame Header, Frame Port, and Frame Payload. The Frame Header contains 
unencrypted metadata of the device, which is the Device Address, Frame Control, Frame 






Figure 6. LoRaWAN Message Format [10] 
 
In Tables: 2, 3, and 4 below: each component of the network and application layer 
of the LoRaWAN message is detailed. The knowledge of the specific functions that each 
field provides within the PHY Payload allows a better understanding of the effects they 
have on the system's safety and efficiency. It is essential to understand the function of 
public fields versus encrypted fields or message integrity codes to understand what 
metadata can be collected.  Public fields allow faster processing for the gateway and 
LoRaWAN Network Server and enable the LoRaWAN Network Server to quickly 
determine NwkSKey's use on the payload to check the MIC. Other public fields are 
useful, yet the most identifying them are the Device Address and Frame Counter. The 
LoRa PHY fields in Figure 6 are not a feature of the LoRaWAN protocol but rather the 





LoRaWAN PHY Payload Structure 
PHY Payload Size (bytes) Description 
MAC Header 1 Distinguishes between six different MAC messages. 
MAC Payload  1 to M Contains the Application Layer Data. 
Message 
Integrity Code 
4 Calculated over the MAC Header and MAC 
Payload( Frame Header, Frame Port, and Frame 
Payload). 
Note. Information is retrieved from the LoRaWAN Specification [10]. 
 
Table 3 
LoRaWAN MAC Payload Structure 
MAC Payload  Size (bytes) Description 
Header 7 to 22 Contains device specific data. 
Port 0 to 1 An application-specific, fully customizable field. 
Payload 0 to N The AppSKey encrypts the sensor data payload. 





LoRaWAN Frame Header Structure 




A 32-bit identifier for end-devices contains a 
NwkAddr and NwkID. 
Frame Control 1 Network control information that controls data 
rate and acknowledgments of previous 
messages. 
Frame Counter 2 Field used for numbering the sequence of the 
frame. A unique Frame Counter adds MIC 
variability. 
Frame Options 0 to 15 Used to change data rate, transmission power, 
and check connection. 
Note. Information is retrieved from the LoRaWAN Specification [10]. 
 
Within the MAC Options layer, the architecture provides three device classes of 
connectivity node to gateway connectivity: Class A, Class B, and Class C. Class A stands 
for “All” device functionality, Class B stands for “Beacon” communications, and class C 
represents “Continuous” communications. The experiments in this work are solely on 
Class A devices as they are more commonly used and are used when longer battery life is 






Figure 7. LoRaWAN Communication Classes [24] 
 
Class A devices are optimized to minimize power expenditure and to have high 
energy efficiency. Class A devices are battery-powered and bidirectional: where the 
nodes can transfer data uplink to a gateway and accept downlink transmissions 
momentarily. These devices are useful when sensors or actuators are used that do not 
have latency constraints and cannot be hardwired or connected to an external cellular or 
Wi-Fi network. Every LoRaWAN device supports this base type of communication. The 
end node opens two slots of time in which the device can receive transmissions from a 
gateway. If a class A device does not receive a message, the node will perform without 
interruption and still send uplink messages to the gateway [11][16]. 
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Class B or Beacon devices are battery-powered and bidirectional, much like Class 
A devices, yet these devices also open up extra received windows at scheduled intervals. 
Class B devices have two receive slots like Class A devices. In addition to the two 
receive slots, Class B devices open additional receive slots at scheduled intervals to 
collect downlink messages. The gateway sends a network beacon transmission to the end 
node to start the beacon period. Within this beacon period, the end device opens a ping 
reception slot at a given interval. When a downlink ping is received from the gateway, 
the end node sends the response. It is worth noting that a Class B device has inherent 
downlink latency restrictions and cannot support Class C functionality [11][16]. 
Class C, or Continuous, devices are mains powered bidirectional devices and 
optimal for actuators and sensors. The two-way communication is maximized due to 
lower latency and a more continuous listening of downlink messages/commands. There is 
a large power draw because there is always an open receive window for the node if it 
does not transmit data. Class C devices have the two receive slots activated after a 
transmission, much like Class A devices. Still, after the second receive slot, the receive 
window remains open until the next uplink message to the gateway. The majority of the 
research within this document will not consider these devices because they are not battery 
resource-restricted and not impacted by changes to the LoRaWAN protocol [11][16]. 
2.5 LoRaWAN Device Activation 
LoRaWAN devices can be activated on the network by multiple procedures. 
These procedures include Activation by Personalization (ABP) and Over the Air 
21 
 
Activation (OTAA) [10]. Each of these activation methods has its benefits and drawbacks 
regarding convenience, security, and power-efficiency.  
        Activation by Personalization (ABP) is the hardcoding of the Device Address 
(DevAddr), NwkSKey, and AppSKey onto the end-device and Network Server [10]. As 
detailed in Figure 7, ABP does not require a handshake between the node and the 
network server; as soon as the node joins the network and the network server has the keys 
mentioned earlier, the node can start sending data to the network. The DevAddr is a 32-
bit device address that is assigned to the device manually. The AppSKey is used to 
encrypt the frame payload (our data) using AES-CTR within the MAC payload nested 
inside the PHY Payload [11]. Once the data is encrypted, the MIC is computed over the 
entire MAC frame payload. The MIC is appended to the MAC frame payload to ensure 
that the packet has not been modified in transit. When using ABP, the device is locked to 
specific network and application servers. Not having a schedule to update the session 
keys always will save the battery life of the node over time, but this will add more 
physical security risk to the system. The downside to this scheme is that the keys are not 
session keys anymore. This downside means that there are preloaded keys, in which 





Figure 8. LoRaWAN: Activation by Personalization [10] 
 
Over the Air Activation (OTAA) is the most recommended method for a node to 
join the network [10]. As seen in Figure 8, OTAA is safer because it allows mutual 
authentication between the device and the network server. With OTAA, the session keys 
are unique per device per session and are regenerated during every join. OTAA is a 
procedure that relies on the preloading of a DevEUI, an AppEUI, and an AppKey.  The 
DevEUI is an Extended Unique Identifier that is a EUI-64-based unique identifier 
attached to the node upon manufacturing. The AppEUI is a global application ID that 
uniquely identifies the node and is used for the activation procedure.  The AppKey, or 
application key, is a 128-bit AES key that helps generate the AppSKey and NwkSKey. 
AppKey privacy is important because if an attacker gets the AppKey, they could generate 
the AppSKey for themselves.  Once OTAA is initiated, the NwkSKey and AppSKey are 
calculated from the AppEUI and AppKey to join the network successfully. When the 
device is rejoined to the network, a DevAddr, NwkSKey, and AppSKey are now 





















This chapter summarizes the technologies, theories, and strategies relevant to the 
proposed solutions within this work. LoRaWAN technology is relatively new and 
continually improving, and there are a few key experiments that helped create the 
problem statement. 
3.1 LPWAN Security Survey 
 In the paper “A Survey on the Security of Low-Power Wide-Area Networks: 
Threats, Challenges, and Potential Solutions,” many research gaps about LPWAN 
networks are detailed [9].  Recent research on key LPWAN security challenges was 
introduced, such as replay attacks, denial-of-service attacks, and more. The effect of the 
attacks and various approaches proposed to solve them are listed within the publication. 
There are multiple types of LPWAN protocols and technologies, and they do share some 
similarities with LoRaWAN networks which are mainly the focus of this work. 
 Side Channel attacks are a threat to LPWAN devices because the secret keys are 
stored in EEPROM on the nodes. The paper highlights the use of better encryption, faster 
encryption, tamper-proof cases for nodes, and authentication measures to combat this 
threat. Device key management flaws or a compromised key affect the data's 
confidentiality in the system [9]. A solution this publication considered is the usage of a 
cryptographic co-processor for key storage. This allows each end node to store the keys 
securely to prevent physical attacks that involve extracting the key from the end node. 
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This requires the use of an external hardware security module or one integrated into the 
node itself.  
3.2 Encryption and Power Consumption 
 Via experimental results, it was concluded that the selection of encryption 
methods used for data transmissions would affect the overall battery consumption for a 
mobile device [17]. The authors of the paper entitled: “Energy-aware Security in M-
Commerce and the Internet of Things” found that the usage of the AES-128 increased 
battery consumption by 75% and processing time by 65% compared to non-encrypted 
transmissions. Compared to AES-128 to encrypt data, using AES-192 increased both 
battery and time consumption by 8%. Compared to AES-128 to encrypt data, using AES-
256 increased both battery and time consumption by 16%. All of the tests were 
completed on a Windows XP Based laptop, and results will vary between different types 
of hardware and software, but generally, these figures show an expected trend.  The 
publication also concluded that the ability to select what level of encryption primitive or 
configuration used would be beneficial to allow an “energy-aware” policy. Thus, the 
future of battery and non-battery powered IoT devices requires some variance in what 
protocols to use for specific devices if this technology is here to stay [17].  
3.3 AES Cryptanalysis 
 D'souza et al. [18] address the AES algorithm's drawbacks and proposes 
improvements by using a Dynamic Key Generation and Dynamic S-Box generation. One 
concern surrounding AES, a symmetric encryption standard recommended by the US 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), is that the security of the data 
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will eventually be broken. AES attacks are still being researched because cyber-attacks 
are continuously developing, and security specialists must keep proposing new systems 
and schemes to keep practical attacks from being successful. The authors state that brute-
force attacks, differential attacks, algebraic attacks, and linear attacks exist. The breaking 
of the symmetric algorithm means that private information can be intercepted and is no 
longer confidential. The dynamic key generation utilizes the value of time at the start of 
the generation and salt to create the key. The dynamic S-Box makes it more difficult for 
attackers to study static sets of S-Boxes. 
 Alanazi et al. [30] have completed research that addresses that AES security is not 
absolute and that the relationship between cost and time enforces AES's security. The 
idea is to retrieve data by finding the valid key; it will cost a large amount of money and 
take a large amount of time. Speculations that government intelligence services may have 
the technical and economic means to attack keys equivalent to about 90 bits. An 
investment budget of 1 million dollars can handle key lengths of about 70 bits. It is noted 
that if the speed of computing devices doubles every year, the higher end of Moore’s 
Law, a crack can be made within the next 10-20 years with a high budget. If an attacker 
can try keys at a rate of one billion keys per second, the attacker will need around 
10,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 years to break AES 128, the weakest of the AES 
algorithms. Increasing to 50 billion keys per second would take 5 x 1021 years to check 
all possible keys, which equals about five thousand billion billion years. 
 When deciding what key length to use, it is essential to know the length of time 
the data will need to be confidential. If the data must be secured for a few hours or a few 
days and the information is no longer interesting or important, the encryption scheme's 
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choice does not need to be the optimal solution. On the other hand, if data must be 
secured for a lifetime, an algorithm that will stand the test of time must be chosen. An 
exhaustive search of AES's keyspace is impractical for many decades unless the 
computational power of practical attacks increases exponentially and there are no 
shortcuts found to bypass the need to default to a brute force attack [30].  
Bogdanov et al. [31] have publicly published the best-known key attack on AES 
called the biclique attack. The biclique approach was originally used in hash 
cryptanalysis and was applied to the AES primitive with Meet-in-the-Middle attacks. The 
best meet-in-the-middle attack on AES-128 is only applicable to as few as four 
transformation rounds. The rounds add confusion to the data, and the transformation 
round structure of AES contains the following operations: SubBytes, ShiftRows, 
MixColumns, and an AddRoundKey. The best key-recovery attack on AES-128 is only 
applicable to as few as seven rounds. The computation complexity of brute force AES is 
related to the key size. The complexity to brute force, or simply to check every possible 
key until the plaintext is found, is O(2128). The security of full AES has not been broken 
because the computation complexity required to run this theoretical attack is 2126 [31]. If 
the complexity was reduced from 2128 to 2127 the keyspace is reduced by a factor of two, 
or simply, divided in half. This means the keyspace that will need to be searched to find 
the correct key is smaller by a factor of four with the biclique key-recovery attack. When 
considering reduced rounds, the best-known attack on 8 round AES-128 is the biclique 
attack with a computation complexity of 2124.9 required to break it [31]. When brute-
forcing full round AES-128, there are 340,282,366,920,938,463,463,374,607,431,768,
211,456 possible keys to check. When running a biclique key recovery attack on full 
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round AES there are about 85,070,591,730,234,615,865,843,651,857,942,052,864 
possible keys. When running a biclique attack on 8 round AES there is a about 
39,686,834,346,933,596,647,877,615,529,848,297,995 possible keys. This attack means 
that practical attacks on a reduced round version of AES 128 will take a longer time than 
it is worth, and therefore using reduced rounds is not unsafe.   
3.4 Round Reduction 
 J.-P. Aumasson, a presenter at Real-World Crypto 2020, concluded in his paper 
“Too Much Crypto” that many cryptography primitives would not be less safe with fewer 
rounds [32]. The various primitives considered to have round reduction implemented 
includes AES-128, which is the only scheme used by the LoRaWAN standard. The paper 
concludes that if performance matters, the number of rounds chosen in creating a 
primitive should be picked after careful cryptanalysis. This fact is even more true in the 
case of LoRaWAN devices because they are resource-constrained devices. Also stated is 
the assumption that the paper will not cause any immediate change in the algorithms 
mentioned. Yet, data scientists and risk management experts should have a say in the 
conversation [32].  
 As far as security is concerned, increasing the number of rounds is a safe way to 
ensure more security, yet this does not benefit resource-constrained devices. More detail 
about the safety of reduced round AES will be prominent in Chapter 4. In a realistic 
scenario, a standard attacker that does not have seemingly infinite resources is more 
likely to find issues with implementation, protocols, and hardware before any attack on 
AES with reduced rounds is worth it. Aumasson argues that if your device uses AES-128 
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and you say that reducing rounds of AES may result in a supercomputer running a 280 
attack, then the overall problem of the security of a system cannot be answered by 
cryptography. You have a bigger problem on your hands [32]. When applying this logic 
to LoRaWAN: if sensor data is sent over public radio waves with the LoRaWAN 
standard AES-128 encryption and adversaries from intelligence organizations are a 
threat, the data should probably not be collected and sent publicly with radio 
transmissions at all. 
Encryption works because it is unlikely that data will be decrypted in an efficient 
and realistic period by realistic attackers. Reducing AES rounds to the suggested nine 
rounds of encryption does not make it more likely that data will be decrypted in an 
efficient and practical time. The time to brute force even 9 rounds of AES is unrealistic 
inefficient. If the data is eventually decrypted, all of the required confidentiality and 
integrity of the data is void. Luckily, the LoRaWAN protocol was set up such that the 
cryptography involved is not just for data hiding but also for ensuring that the data is 
coming from the correct source; therefore, two keys would need to be cracked to cause 
the maximum amount of malice to the system.  
3.5 Literature Review Summary 
The idea presented in this work is to utilize current research factors and 
implement various improvements that favor battery life and those that favor security and 
find a balance between these two. Multiple configurations of a LoRaWAN node are 
tested and the results are assessed. These configurations offer to the end-user the ability 
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to choose to use a higher security policy based on their data security needs or a higher 



















LoRaWAN Security Vulnerabilities and Solutions 
4.1 Overview 
The LoRaWAN protocol is secure in terms of data itself because the protocol 
implements cryptographic mechanisms to ensure payloads remain secure throughout the 
frame's life. The security implementation is future-proofed and makes LoRaWAN 
devices safe to use in many industries. Though the protocols used are secure, security 
vulnerabilities are exposed due to improper implementation of a LoRaWAN Network. 
Another reason is the use of metadata. The threat types that can affect a LoRaWAN 
network are disclosure threats, alteration threats, and denial or destruction threats. If 
proper precautions are not taken, the LoRaWAN network can become exposed to 
physical attacks, metadata collection, triangulation, malicious gateways, and replay 
attacks. 
4.2 Physical Attacks 
Due to the portable and remote nature of LoRaWAN end nodes, the most 
challenging security issue in IoT is resiliency against physical attacks. This type of attack 
is when a malicious actor tampers with hardware components or access credentials on a 
device. LoRaWAN devices are typically unattended and distributed, making them more 
vulnerable to these types of attacks, especially when they are provisioned for outdoor 
applications [9].  
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      A common threat type on LoRaWAN devices is denial or destruction threats. 
These threats remove the devices from the network and affect the availability of the 
system. Alteration threats such as sensor manipulation are another way to add false data 
into a system that compromises the data's integrity. Next, with LoRaWAN devices, keys 
can be read from the devices and utilized to create a malicious node. Simple deterrent 
measures can be added to individual nodes within a LoRaWAN network and are listed 
below.  
First, tamper-proof containers for the nodes can add a layer of physical protection 
to the hardware. If more physical security beyond that is required, movement sensors 
near the nodes can be implemented. The activation of the sensors can send a message to 
the network server to run logic that blocks uplink data or can set up a downlink payload 
to the nodes nearby. Similarly, data streams can be analyzed on the application server, 
and if the payloads received are unusual or do not fit within an input validation scheme, a 
downlink message can be sent to deactivate the node on the network server-side. As a last 
resort, kill switches, which disable a device when an attack is detected, can also be used 
to combat physical attacks [9]. 
To ensure the most significant cyber-physical attack protection, protecting the 
keys on the device is critical. We must protect the keys on the device that allow 
confidential data to be sent to the network server using a hardware security module or 
cryptographic coprocessor that can be added to a node. A hardware security module 
allows secure key storage that ensures the keys cannot be extracted from the node. The 
result of this is more robust authentication security to the node. The ATECC508A is a 
chip that offers 10Kb EEPROM memory for key storage, certificates, and data. To 
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protect the microcontroller's physical security, a cryptographic co-processor such as the 
ATECC508A has several security features built-in [28].  
If a malicious entity wishes to obtain secret information from the chip via 
modification, manipulation or probing: the use of active shields is a countermeasure to 
the attack. There is a feature called Active Shield Circuitry, which provides the chip with 
self-detect physical attacks and helps protect the memory on the device. The integrated 
circuit has metal lines covering it, and there are predefined random data ran across the 
lines. From then, a receiver observes the data [33]. The physical attacks will disturb the 
integrity of the shielding lines that contain random test data as the receiver will not get 
the correct data because the lines will short circuit or open [33].  
The ATECC508A chip also has internal memory encryption to protect the 
EEPROM memory that contains keys, certificates, and data from being read [28]. The 
chip additionally offers Glitch Protection by use of filters when active or sleep. The 
alternating current pulses are monitored to ensure the device ignores any shorter or longer 
pulses than the filter values [28]. The supply voltage and logic clock are generated in the 
chip, which prevents any voltage tampering on the device's pins. Included is a NIST 
CAVP certified Random Number Generator with a dynamic internal seed stored in the 
EEPROM [28].  
4.3 Malicious Gateways 
Malicious gateways are another potential threat to the security of a LoRaWAN 
network. Malicious gateways capture the data sent on the radio frequency or could go as 
far as to spoof existing trusted gateways. Through malicious gateways, attackers can filter 
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out packets that are upstream to the network server or downstream to a gateway and 
falsely confirm uplink messages so that they never make it to the network server. 
Utilizing confirmed uplink and downlink messages can help combat this attack [9][11]. 
 In terms of LoRaWAN node technology, confirmed uplink messages mean our 
LoRaWAN device requires the network to confirm that the message was received by 
sending confirmed downlink messages. Confirmed downlink messages are simply the 
opposite, meaning the LoRaWAN network sends a confirmation frame to the node that 
received the message. The implementation of any of these will keep the radio frequency 
transmitter powered on longer and increase the overhead and thus the battery power draw 
over time. In this case, Class C devices that are hooked up to the main power line will 
benefit the most from this configuration. Class B devices implement confirmed downlink 
messages and, as a result, are less efficient compared to Class A devices.  
 Suppose the node requires downlink messages from the gateway, and there is a 
concern with malicious gateways sending false downlink messages. In that case, the 
solution is to remove the need for downlink messages entirely on standard data 
transmissions. This will not affect the OTAA scheme as there is a separate MAC 
command for that. An issue with removing downlink messages to the node is that some 
data may be lost if it is not requested to be resent.  
4.4 Untrusted Network Servers 
  To ensure that the application can trust the network server, the same 
organization must create the network server. The network server and the application 
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server are designed to be end-to-end encrypted, but this is possible to override in reality. 
A malicious untrusted network server can derive the AppSKey during the OTAA stage. 
If an untrusted network server does this operation, the end-to-end encryption is 
broken. Therefore, only trusted network servers should be used if a LoRaWAN network 
is required because application data is now exposed to the network server. This does limit 
the scalability of the LoRaWAN node because the usage of a third-party network server 
limits the number of available options. 
4.5 Metadata Collection 
Because LoRaWAN technology uses a public frequency, public metadata fields 
exist, as seen in Chapter 2.4, Figure 6. Public fields in the metadata are cleartext that is 
visible to all gateways that capture the radio frequency. Anyone can set up a gateway and 
collect the activity of end nodes. An attacker can access this and make assumptions about 
what may be in the payload, even though they cannot decrypt the data field within the 
payload. Though this is not a direct attack on confidentiality, this information may be 
helpful in certain situations during the reconnaissance phase. Metadata collection is 
difficult to solve because the metadata is used by gateways to determine if the packet 
should be processed. However, metadata collection can be combated with a few 
measures. 
One method of reducing metadata collection is to utilize a highly directional radio 
frequency transmitter, which targets the direction of the frequency [38]. By default, LoRa 
devices use an omnidirectional transmitter. Targeting the frequency in a specific direction 
ensures that a limited number of gateways will pick up the signal. Another method to 
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combat metadata collection is to pad all payloads to be a set size to not reveal any hints at 
what is being sent by the packet based on external data observed. Padding the packets 
does add overhead to the LoRaWAN transmissions due to the processing involved. The 
extra bytes added to pad the payload will need to be processed by the encryption 
algorithm, resulting in a longer processing time and higher energy expenditure. 
 The simplest way to protect against device and frame counter metadata collection 
is to upload code onto the node that allows OTAA on a schedule [39]. This work will 
reference this scheme of OTAA on a schedule as Join Scheduling. OTAA not only 
requests a new NetID, DevAddr, and AppNonce, but it also resets public fields such as 
the frame counter and public dev address. The AppNonce allows the generation of the 
new NwkSKey and AppSKey. OTAA rejoins the node to the network, and the device 
address and the frame counter are no longer the same. If metadata is being collected and 
the device address and frame counter always change while using Join Scheduling, there 
are fewer frames with public data that can be mapped to a single node.  
A more advanced method to reduce the impact metadata collection has than Join 
Scheduling is a change to the protocol to ensure that the device address and frame 
counter are not public. The original LoRaWAN standard PHY payload creation method 
makes device addresses and frame counters public and allows data to be tracked during 
the reconnaissance stage of an attack. A proposed Metadata Hiding scheme will ensure 




The encryption scheme must be understood and mapped to analyze improvements 
to the encoding process of the PHY payload on an end node.  The following steps 
required for payload encoding are listed below, and they are illustrated in Figure 10. The 
information is based on the LoRaWAN specifications for MAC message formats [10]. 
Figures 10 to 15 include ciphertext, cleartext, and plaintext. The ciphertext is defined as 
encrypted data, cleartext is information that is not intended to be encrypted or 
transformed even when privacy is being used, and plaintext is information that is 
intended to be encrypted [28].  
Step 1: The Frame Port is set to 0x1. If the Frame Port is not set to zero, the 
protocol dictates that the Frame Payload is encrypted by the AppSKey.  
Step 2: The Data field is the data that is measured by a sensor, and it is then 
encrypted using the AES-128 algorithm with the AppSKey as the key. Every 
cleartext field is populated before Step 3. 
Step 3: Once the PHY payload is created, the MIC is computed using AES-
CMAC, and it is attached to the PHY payload. The end node contains both the 
keys, and the network server has the NwkSKey, and the application server has the 





Figure 10. LoRaWAN Standard End Node PHY Payload Encoding 
 
Concerning the goal of finding improvements to the PHY payload's decoding 
process within the network server, the decryption scheme must be understood and 
mapped. The following steps required for payload decoding in Figure 11 below are as 
follows: 
Step 1: The Frame Port is set to 0x1, which dictates that the AppSKey was used 
to encrypt the frame payload.  
Step 2: The PHY payload is sent through the AES-CMAC algorithm with the 
NwkSKey, and a MIC is generated. 
Step 3: The network server verifies that the calculated MIC matches the MIC of 
the PHY payload.  If they are both the same, then the data was not modified 
during transfer, and the device address and device counter were not changed. 
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Step 4: The packet has now been cleared to be sent to the Application Server, 
which has the AppSKey required to decrypt the payload.  This step helps ensure 
that the network server does not have access to the encrypted frame payload, thus 
satisfying end-to-end encryption.  
 
 
Figure 11. LoRaWAN Standard PHY Payload Decoding 
 
In Figure 12 below, a proposed method of hiding the device address and frame 
counter is outlined to favor end-to-end encryption. A random device address and frame 
counter are also generated to add variability. The following steps required for improved 
node frame encoding with an untrusted network server are as follows: 
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Step 1: The first step is to set the Frame Port to 0x2. The value 0x2 is chosen to 
differentiate that the network server shall not use the standard PHY payload 
decoding scheme.  
Step 2: A random Device Address and Frame Count is generated and placed 
within their prospective fields. Each of these values is generated with a random 
seed to allow a pseudo-random sequence of pseudo-random numbers. This seed is 
to be shared with the Network Server during the activation phase. 
Step 3: The sensor data is encrypted with the AppSKey and placed into the 
unencrypted Frame Payload that contains the real Device Address and Frame 
Counter. The Encrypted Data field's size is equal to the size of the plaintext data 
field as the AES-128 CTR mode of operation is used.  
Step 4: This step involves the encrypting of the frame Payload that contains 
encrypted sensor data with the NetSKey and device address, frame counter, and 
sensor data with the AppSKey and placing it into the PHY Payload.  
Step 5: The final step involves computing the MIC using the AES-CMAC 
algorithm and the NwkSKey and attaching it to the frame. The packet can now be 






Figure 12. LoRaWAN Improved Node Frame Encoding with Untrusted Network 
Server 
 
Within Figure 13, the proposed changes to the PHY Payload decoding scheme are 
made for an untrusted network server. There is overhead involved with this decoding 
method because the device address and frame count need to be decrypted before the 
packet can be considered a packet from an authenticated node. This action means that 
every packet that it captures will need to be checked. The overhead is negligible if the 
gateway is connected to a wall power supply. The steps required are as follows: 
Step 1: The Frame Port field must be verified to contain the value 0x2 to continue 
to Step 2. If the value is not 0x3 (reserved) or 0x2, then the cleartext device 
address and frame count should be considered accurate, and the standard decoding 
method should be running. 
42 
 
Step 2: The proper NwkSKey for the payload can be found by matching the 
spoofed device address with the PRNG result after the seed is supplied. The result 
is precomputed before the incoming packet arrives. This allows a quick mapping 
from the spoofed device address attached to the packet to the NwkSKey and the 
real DevAddr. This step also involves using the NwkSKey and the AES-128 CTR 
algorithm to decrypt the Frame Payload data. The resulting data is the plaintext 
Device Address and Frame Counter and the encrypted sensor Data field that can 
only be unencrypted by the AppSKey. 
Step 3: If the Frame Counter extracted from the decrypted frame payload is the 
expected value, the packet has not been replayed. If the value Frame Counter is 
not the expected value, the packet is thrown out.  
Step 4: The  PHY payload, except for the MIC, is sent through the AES-CMAC 
algorithm with the NwkSKey, then a MIC is generated.  
Step 5: The generated MIC is compared to the MIC of the frame, and if they 
match, the data and device address were not modified.  
Step 6: The Data field is encrypted by the AppSKey and placed into the Frame 
Payload field.  
Step 7: The real Device Address and real Frame Counter are added to the packet 
and the spoofed versions are thrown out. This action ensures the Application 
Server knows what device the data is coming from and the correct order. 
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Step 8: Indicates a frame with the correct Device Address, Frame Counter, and 
Encrypted Data and can be decrypted on the Application Server by the AppSKey. 
The Network Server does not need to map which device address matches with an 
AppSKey, and end-to-end encryption is maintained. 
 
 
Figure 13. LoRaWAN Improved Network Server PHY Payload Decoding with 
Untrusted Network Server 
 
In Figure 14 below, a proposed method of hiding the device address and frame 
counter is illustrated for a trusted network server. The following steps required for 
encoding a frame that will be sent to a trusted network server is as follows: 
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Step 1: The Frame Port is set to 0x3. The Frame Port can be set to any number 
between 1 to 255; this is to dictate that a packet with data is being sent. The value 
0x3 is chosen to differentiate that the network server will not use the standard 
PHY payload decoding or the improved frame decoding for untrusted network 
servers. This allows the original method to be used to encode and decode data as 
well as additional procedures. 
Step 2: The cleartext Device Address and Frame Count are replaced with random 
addresses and counts to add confusion to the device's true identity. Each of these 
values is generated with a random seed to allow a pseudo-random sequence of 
pseudo-random numbers. This seed is to be shared with the Network Server 
during the activation phase. 
Step 3: Involves encrypting the real device address, frame counter, and sensor 
data with the AppSKey and placing it into the PHY Payload.  
Step 4: Involves computing the MIC using the AES-CMAC algorithm and the 





Figure 14. LoRaWAN Improved Node Frame Encoding with Trusted Network 
Server 
 
In Figure 15 below, the proposed changes to the PHY Payload decoding scheme 
are made for a Trusted Network Server. Like the untrusted decoding scheme, there is 
overhead. Every LoRaWAN transmission that is received must have the decryption 
algorithm ran to extract the correct device address and frame count. The following steps 
required for decoding a frame that will be sent to a trusted network server is as follows: 
Step 1: The Frame Port field must be verified to contain the value 0x3. If the field 
is 0x3, then the following steps should be taken. Otherwise, the original decoding 
scheme should be completed if the value is not 0x3 or 0x2.  
Step 2: The proper AppSKey and NwkSKey for the payload can be found by 
matching the spoofed device address with the PRNG result after the seed is 
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supplied. The result is precomputed before the incoming packet arrives. This 
action allows a quick mapping from the spoofed device address attached to the 
packet to the AppSKey and the real DevAddr. This step also involves the 
AppSKey and the AES-128 algorithm to decrypt the data from the Frame 
Payload. Typically, the network server should not have access to the AppSKey to 
ensure that end to end encryption is enforced. If the application server trusts the 
network server and this is not required, the network server can save the NwkSKey 
with the node's device address. This step involves the AppSKey and the Frame 
Payload's decryption and unveils the proper Device Address, the Frame Counter, 
and sensor data.   
Step 3: If the Frame Counter extracted from the decrypted frame payload is the 
expected value, the packet has not been replayed. If the value Frame Counter is 
not the expected value, the packet is thrown out. 
Step 4: The PHY payload, except for the MIC, is sent through the AES-CMAC 
algorithm with the NwkSKey and a MIC is generated.  
Step 5: The generated MIC is compared to the MIC of the frame, and if they 
match, the data and device address were not modified.  
Step 6: The plaintext Data field is encrypted by the AppSKey and placed into the 
Frame Payload field. This action ensures that the Frame Payload is encrypted 
when it is sent to the application server. 
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Step 7: The real Device Address and Frame Counter are placed inside the Frame 
Header in their respective positions. This ensures the Application Server will 
know what device the payload comes from and the sequence it arrives. 
Step 8: This indicates a frame with the correct Device Address, Frame Counter, 
and Encrypted Data and can be sent to and be decrypted by the Application Server 
with the AppSKey. 
 
 
Figure 15. LoRaWAN Improved PHY Payload Decoding with Trusted Network 
Server 
 
The encoding schemes that utilize the metadata hiding in the frame payload add 
time and computational overhead to the encryption method. The maximum Frame 
Payload size depends on the Spreading Factor required for transmission [10]. For a 
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Spreading Factor of 10-12, 51 bytes is the maximum frame payload size. For a Spreading 
factor of 9, the maximum frame payload size is 115 bytes. For a Spreading Factor of 7-8, 
the maximum frame payload size is 222 bytes. 
The total size added to the payload with the device address and frame counter is 6 
bytes. The size of the plaintext data that goes through the AES encryption is the same as 
the ciphertext output size due to AES-128 CTR mode [8]. With the extra 6 bytes added to 
the Frame Payload, the maximum application data size changes. For a Spreading Factor 
of 10-12, 41 bytes is the maximum frame payload size. For a Spreading factor of 9, the 
maximum frame payload size is 105 bytes. For a Spreading Factor of 7-8, the maximum 
frame payload size is 212 bytes. 
4.6 Replay Attacks 
Replay Attacks are the capturing, storing, and sending of messages that were 
originally sent to a gateway [9]. These messages can be publicly captured from a 
malicious gateway and then re-sent to a malicious node later. Replay attacks allow the 
attacker node to replay action from the past and send it to the server. A common mistake 
when implementing the LoRaWAN network is to set it up without packet filtering. One 
way to combat replay attacks is to ensure that the network server can keep track of the 
packet counter and filter out the repeated message. The MIC provides a level of replay 
protection because the device address and frame counter will need to be correct to 





LoRaWAN Testbed Design 
5.1 Overview 
Conductive to evaluating the cybersecurity posture and power expenditure of a 
LoRaWAN sensor network, the physical hardware and software that is commonly used in 
a real-world sensor network must be obtained and configured. It was a critical 
requirement to develop a platform for rigorous testing of the LoRaWAN protocol that 
allows complete customization and reliable measurements. A testbed implementation of a 
standard LoRaWAN network, as illustrated in Figure 16 below, was created. Multiple 
hardware and software configurations were configured to add variability in the 
experimental phase of this work. The testbed's core elements include the network server 
stack, gateway, end nodes, and power monitor. 
 
 
Figure 16. LoRaWAN Testbed Architecture 
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5.2 LoRa Gateway and LoRa Node 
To get a better understanding of a base LoRa system's features, a LoRa gateway 
was set up to receive base LoRa data. The open-source gateway that was chosen was the 
Dragino LG01 [34]. With the gateway, a built-in web server is available to view, 
customize, and set up a means of data transfer to external platforms such as The Things 
Network (TTN) [35]. The web server GUI can be accessed via a Wi-Fi Hotspot or LAN. 
The maximum range for signal transmission to the gateway has a maximum range of 
about three to six miles. 
For the sake of analyzing LoRa PHY transmissions without any of the benefits of 
LoRaWAN, the Dragino Arduino Shield featuring LoRa technology is used. The 915 
MHZ band is preprogrammed into the radio frequency transmitter for the US region’s 
communications. The Dragino shield utilizes an Arduino Uno form factor and is 
controlled by a sketch loaded onto the Arduino Uno. Also required is the RadioHead 
Arduino library, which allows access to the Arduino radio hardware and supports the 





Figure 17. Dragino Shield with Microcontroller Board 
 
5.3 Network Server Stack Architecture 
Due to the star topology implementation between nodes and gateways, 
LoRaWAN nodes may be selected from many different manufacturers. Many different 
types of capture data and ways to utilize the radio transmitter hardware. LoRaWAN 
nodes are available in open source and commercial ready packages that allow fast 
development and easy integration into an existing LoRaWAN network.  As long as the 
LoRaWAN node supports the same LoRaWAN standard and can set NwkSKeys and 
AppSKeys, the gateways can gather the activation by personalization context. Most of the 
existing stacks have the option of ABP, yet OTAA is suggested for real-world 
implementations due to dynamic session keys' security benefit. 
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The open-source network stack that is selected for analysis is the ChirpStack 
LoRaWAN stack. This stack was chosen because of the compatibility and extensive 
documentation while interfacing with various models of LoRaWAN modules. This open-
source software also contains all of the software needed to gather data from the 
transmitter, send it to the network server, and route it to an application server. The 
ChirpStack LoRaWAN server's architecture contains many components that have a 
separation of concerns, collectively allowing data to be captured, forwarded, validated, 
saved, accessed, and more. Figure 18 details the full ChirpStack server stack, including 
Gateway components, servers, and external integrations. 
 
    
Figure 18. ChirpStack Architecture [20] 
 
The components within the Cloud/server/VM section of the stack include the 
ChirpStack Gateway Bridge, ChirpStack Network Server, and the ChirpStack 
Application server. The specific software, hardware, and configuration settings for the 
End Nodes that send data and the gateway itself will be detailed. They offer an extended 
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level of complexity and a much larger scale of customization. Moreover, it is worth 
noting that the “Cloud/server/vm” components can all be hosted remotely or within the 
gateway itself, and in the case of this testbed, it is all located on the gateway itself. 
 The ChirpStack Application Server is responsible for the management and 
inventory of devices and handling join requests and the encryption and decryption of 
application payloads. The web interface allows access to the network server functionality 
and a way to create organizations, users, applications, and devices. Additionally, a REST 
API enables endpoints to manage the LoRaWAN network when it comes to integrations, 
devices, and more. Due to the device data being encrypted with the AppSKey and the 
NwkSKey, device data can be decrypted, and the data can be viewed for testing purposes. 
Figure 19 below shows the format of the Application Server and the various ways to 
visualize application data. 
 
 
Figure 19. ChirpStack Application Server 
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The ChirpStack Network Server is responsible for all authentication, 
encryption/decryption, the LoRaWAN mac-layer, application server communication, and 
the scheduling of downlink frames. The network server makes device activation possible 
in an ABP or OTAA context. One advanced setting is called ADR (adaptive data rate) 
that lets the server control the device's transmission power and data rate. A control panel 
that allows the setup of devices and configuration of the network is hosted by the server 
and accessed at port 8080. Other features include the ability to create device profiles, set 
up battery status requests, synchronize time with the end nodes, manage the entire 
gateway, and even send firmware updates to gateways or nodes.  
The Pub/Sub broker utilizes the MQTT( Message Queuing Telemetry Transport) 
protocol, a lightweight, standard publish-subscribe network protocol that enables the 
bidirectional message transport between devices [36]. The broker is the Eclipse 
Mosquitto MQTT broker, which is open-source, efficient, and scalable from lightweight 
devices to full-size servers. The specific purpose of this integration is to ensure that the 
data that it receives is published as JSON (JavaScript Object Notation), a standard data 
exchange format and file format [37]. The broker's data may be sent uplink to the 
network server or downlink to the ChirpStack Gateway Bridge. The ChirpStack Network 
Server Must subscribe to the application and device id to gather data from the broker. 



























5.4 LoRaWAN Gateway 
The open-source, commercial gateway chosen to receive the LoRaWAN node 
radio signal in this work is the RAK2245 RPi HAT Edition WisLink LPWAN 
Concentrator. This concentrator is compatible with a Raspberry Pi Form factor and is 
compatible with Raspberry Pi 3 Model B+ or Micro Computers for DIY setup of a 
commercial LoRaWAN Network. The gateway supports 903-927.5Mhz radio frequencies 
for the LoRaWAN standard and supports eight channels that allow different uplink 
frequencies to be processed by the radio transmitter. While this is a concentrator, the 
radio module can also send downlink LoRaWAN messages with two Semtech SX125X 
front end radio chips. The RAK2245 Pi Hat board arrives with an IPEX Antenna and 
GPS Active antenna to track the gateway's location. The hardware required to set up the 
gateway is detailed in Table 5. 
 
Table 5 
LoRaWAN Gateway Components 
Hardware Type Description 
Single Board Computer Raspberry Pi 3B+ 
LPWAN Concentrator RAK2245 Pi HAT 
Memory Card 16GB SD Card 




For the sake of simplicity, the Network Server and Application Server are both 
hosted on the Gateway. The packet forwarder processes the LoRaWAN data received by 
the Semtech LoRa Radio Module on the RAK2245. The packet forwarder used is the 
ChirpStack Concentratord [sic], a concentrator daemon decoupled from the gateway 
hardware, allowing the ability to run multiple packet-forwarding applications 
simultaneously. The ChirpStack Gateway Bridge connects the packet forwarder to the 
ChirpStack Network server. The bridge converts the hardware abstraction layer protocol 
that the packet forwarder uses to a network server readable JSON format. The data is 
transmitted from the packet forwarder to the gateway bridge via UDP by default but can 
be modified to MQTT to ensure no packet loss. 
Each of these components is required to be running to accept data from end 
nodes. The RAK2245 is a Pi HAT (Hardware Attached on Top) that plugs directly 
without the need to solder into the Raspberry Pi that hosts the operating system. The 
gateway can act as a node to transmit data from the gateway's location as well without the 
need to transfer to another gateway. The RAK2245 also includes a GPS module, as seen 





Figure 22. LoRaWAN Gateway 
 
5.5 LoRaWAN Evaluation Board 
 The RAK4600 Evaluation Board is a LoRaWAN development board made up of 
the RAK4600 LPWAN module and a RAK5005 Base. The LPWAN module allows the 
usage of LoRaWAN on the 915 MHz band. The WisBlock Base offers an overall ultra-
low power consumption and UART/GPIO interface for sensors. This RAK4600 EVB 
also has Bluetooth capabilities to update the firmware or send commands to the device 
during the provisioning process. The manufacturer's power consumption rating is 2.0 µA 
in sleep mode, which is extremely low and allows a long battery life. The supply voltage 





Figure 23. RAK4600 Evaluation Board [21] 
 
5.6 LoRaWAN Node with Stock Firmware 
The WisDuino Evaluation Board (RAK811) is a development board that can 
optionally be attached to the GPIO pins of a microcontroller to control the radio 
frequency module on the HAT. The logic that controls the join, transfer, and receive 
functionality is all by calling AT commands provided by the shield's firmware. The name 
AT is an abbreviation for Attention, and these commands were initially designed in the 
early 80s for controlling modems. The firmware of this device uses these commands, and 
they are still in use in most modern smartphones to support telephony functions. Below is 





Figure 24. RAK811 Shield 
 
In this configuration, the RAK811 utilizes the onboard factory firmware to 
directly carry out AT commands from the RAK Serial Port Tool. Through the serial port 
tool, various settings can be extracted from the RAK811, such as the firmware version, 
device status, LoRa radio status, etc. Through this tool, the setup of a device can be 
completed without the need to upload code. The device can be set to restart, sleep, or 
send mode. For OTAA, the AppKey, DevAddr, APP EUI, and Dev EUI can be set up. 
The configuration for this node looks just like the previous configuration. 
5.7 LoRaWAN Shield with Microcontroller Board 
 The RAK811 Shield with Microcontroller Board is a LoRaWAN Node that is 
attached to a SparkFun RedBoard Qwiic. The RedBoard has less idle current draw than 
an Arduino Uno and has a very similar form factor. The main benefit of using a 
RedBoard is adding external devices quickly via a Qwiic connector. The code on the 
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Microcontroller controls the firmware on the RAK811 by calling AT commands. The 
Node is shown below in Figure 24. 
 
 
Figure 25. RAK811 Shield with Microcontroller Board 
 
5.8 LoRaWAN Node with Arduino Sketch 
The RAK811 can have an Arduino Sketch loaded onto it without the need for a 
base microcontroller. This configuration can handle the measurement of the sensor data 
through the GPIO pins.  The logic that controls when to utilize the radio hardware is 
controlled by the sketch on board the microcontroller and the LMIC, HAL, and SPI 
Libraries. The configuration for this node looks just like the previous configuration 
without the microcontroller. 
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5.9 Power Monitoring  
The equipment used to monitor the current, power, and voltage is the Monsoon 
Power Monitor (MPM). The measurements are measured through the main channel 
through the alligator clips. The alligator clips are attached to the output power and ground 
pins to capture the power data over time. The voltage that powers the microcontroller can 
be set anywhere from 3.35V to 4.5V. The fine current scale accuracy is +/- 1% or +/- 50 
µA (whichever is greater). The fine current scale resolution is 1µA, which is suitable for 
the monitoring of LoRaWAN nodes. The MPM is pictured below in Figure 25. 
 
 
Figure 26. Monsoon Power Monitor Hardware 
 
The software used to interface with the Monsoon Power Monitor (MPM) is the 
PowerTool software. The PowerTool software is used to analyze the performance of 
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devices by monitoring the power data statistics. The graph shows the instantaneous 
metrics over time and can be zoomed in or out. Specific time frames can be selected, and 
the power data for that period can be displayed. Specific time frames can be chosen to 
power on and off the power monitor in a particular time frame. The samples captured 
over time can be saved in a capture file as well as a CSV file.  Figure 26 displays a 
capture of the current overtime for a device.  
 
 




Figure 27 below looks at a real LoRaWAN transmission captured by the software 
as a CSV file, converted into a graph to visualize the instantaneous current over time. The 
Class A device modes are all shown, and the sleep mode can be set to a required interval.  
The Active Mode Duration includes all the activity when the node wakes up until it goes 
back to sleep. 
 
 










Experiments and Results 
6.1 Procedure 
To determine the impact of reduced rounds, join scheduling, and hidden public 
fields on the power draw of a LoRaWAN node, certain power data variables must be 
measured and analyzed. The various configurations of devices described in the previous 
chapter are measured to determine trends and find a viable solution to some of the 
detrimental side effects of the LoRaWAN networking protocol. This data gathering helps 
decide on optimal LoRaWAN network settings and configurations while still keeping the 
transferred data secure. The conclusions made will allow improved operating costs for 
industries using this technology. Additionally, they will also ensure that a LoRaWAN 
network's set-up is done with power efficiency and security in mind. 
6.2 LoRaWAN Evaluation Board 
The LoRaWAN Evaluation Board requires the lowest voltage to run and does not 
consume as much energy as a LoRaWAN module with an Arduino Uno form factor. The 
purpose of testing this board is to determine the best possible battery life for the LoRa 
chip used in all of the experiments. The data in Table 6 below is the average of 30 







LoRaWAN Evaluation Board Power Data  
Power Metric Idle Performance 
Average Voltage 3.35 V 
Average Power 0.96 mW 
Average Current 0.29 mA 
Battery Capacity 3500 mAh 
Expected Battery Life 12,151.50 hours (16.64 months) 
 
 
6.3 LoRaWAN Node with Stock Firmware 
 The LoRaWAN Shield with Stock Firmware was selected to test the firmware 
preloaded onto the hardware on arrival. There is no way to customize the firmware to test 
the round reduction or metadata hiding scheme's power data. However, OTAA is possible 
to measure. The data in Table 7 below shows the Power Data during the wakeup and 
transfer mode. The data in Table 8 below shows both the data for a full transmission and 







LoRaWAN Node with Stock Firmware Transfer Power Data 
Power Metric Idle Performance 
Average Time 62.864 ms 
Average Current 100.211 mA 




LoRaWAN Node Average Power Data 
Power Metric Result 
Average Tx Time 2.133 s 
Average Tx Current 14.507 mA 
Average Tx Consumed Energy 8.589 µAh 
Average OTAA Time 5.149 s 
Average OTAA Current 12.545 mA 






6.4 LoRaWAN Shield with Microcontroller Board 
The LoRaWAN Shield with Microcontroller Board was selected to test external 
control of the firmware via a microcontroller. There is no way to customize the firmware 
to test the power data for the round reduction or metadata hiding scheme, yet OTAA 
measuring is possible. The benefit to this configuration is the ability to easily add 
additional logic to the node, such as using an external cryptographic coprocessor or 
sending data at specific intervals. The data in Table 9 below is the average of 30 




LoRaWAN Shield with Microcontroller Transfer Power Data 
Power Metric Idle Performance 
Average Time 69.511 ms 
Average Current 104.363 mA 










LoRaWAN Shield with Microcontroller Average Power Data  
Power Metric Idle Performance 
Average Tx Time 2.141 s 
Average Tx Current 14.987 mA 
Average Tx Consumed Energy 8.908 µAh 
Average OTAA Time 5.131 s 
Average OTAA Current 18.430 mA 
Average OTAA Consumed Energy 17.90 µAh 
 
6.5 LoRaWAN Node with Arduino Sketch 
 The LoRaWAN Node with Sketch was selected to modify the LMIC code 
responsible for the AES encryption of the data. The number of rounds can be decreased, 
and the power data measurements such as time, average current, and consumed energy 
are below in Figures 28, 29, and 30. Each measurement was completed 30 times to ensure 
accuracy. The average was calculated to ensure the results are less atypical. Table 11 
below shows the power data metrics for the LoRaWAN Shield with the Arduino Sketch 
and libraries loaded onto it. There are variances in the power metrics for the sketch, 
mainly due to the LMIC library usage. These variances are due to the devices running on 
a higher average current for slightly more extended periods, especially regarding OTAA. 
When the devices are in the receive state, there is a higher “idle” current draw. This 
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results in more energy consumed over a more extended period than the nodes that utilize 
the stock firmware. 
 
Table 11 
LoRaWAN Shield with Arduino Sketch Average Power Data  
Power Metric Idle Performance 
Average Tx Time (10 Round) 2.1207 s 
Average Tx Current (10 Round) 21.8209 mA 
Average Tx Consumed Energy (10 Round) 12.849 µAh 
Average Tx Time (9 Round) 2.1149 s 
Average Tx Current (9 Round) 21.4863 mA 
Average Tx Consumed Energy (9 Round) 12.614 µAh 
Average Tx Time (8 Round) 2.1129 s 
Average Tx Current (8 Round) 21.1335 mA 
Average Tx Consumed Energy (8 Round) 12.384 µAh 
Average Tx Time (10 Round + MH) 2.1516 s 
Average Tx Current (10 Round + MH) 22.1241 mA 
Average Tx Consumed Energy (10 Round + MH) 13.217 µAh 
Average Tx Time (9 Round + MH) 2.1494 s 
Average Tx Current (9 Round + MH) 22.0443 mA 




Table 11 (continued) 
Power Metric Idle Performance 
Average Tx Time (8 Round + MH) 2.1329 s 
Average Tx Current (8 Round + MH) 21.9209 mA 
Average Tx Consumed Energy (8 Round + MH) 12.990 µAh 
Average OTAA Time 5.5423 s 
Average OTAA Current 28.6813 mA 























Analysis and Statistics 
7.1 Equations 
The parameters used to calculate battery life over time are shown in Table 12 
below. The power data and battery consumption parameters are gathered from the 
experiment section of this work using the power monitor. The result approximates the 
estimated battery life for a node at a given average current consumption. 
 
Table 12  
Power Data and Battery Consumption Equation Parameters 
Variable Description 
I Interval of Data Transmission 
ATotal Total Time in Active mode 
TxTotal Total Time in Wake + Transmit mode 
RxTotal Total Time in Receive mode 
STotal Time in Sleep Duration 
RxDelay1 Time in RxDelay1 
RxDelay2 Time in RxDelay2 
Rx1 Time in Rx1 




Table 12 (continued) 
Variable Description 
ACActive Average Current during Active Mode 
ACTx Average Current during Tx 
ACRx1 Average Current during Rx1 
ACRx2 Average Current during Rx2 
ACRx1Delay Average Current during RxDelay1 
ACRx2Delay Average Current during RxDelay2 
ACSleep Average Current during Sleep Mode 
RA Ratio of Time in Active Mode 
RS Ratio of Time in Sleep Mode 
BC Battery Capacity in mAh 
DC Average Device Current in mA 
BLHours Estimated Battery Life in Hours, based on 
ideal conditions 
Variable Description 
I Interval of Data Transmission 
ATotal Total Time in Active mode 
 
   
Equation 1 below results in calculating the total amount of time the device is in 
receive mode during a transmission. The variables match those required according to the 
LoRaWAN Class A device transmission scheme. Equation 2 below results in calculating 
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the total amount of time the device is in an active mode. The total time in the wake and 
transmit mode and the result of Equation 1 (the total time in receive mode) are required. 
Equation 3 below allows the calculation of the ratio of the total time a node is in active 
mode between transmissions. The result requires the total amount of time throughout 
transmissions. Equation 4 below allows the calculation of the ratio of time in sleep mode 
between transmissions and requires the total amount of time the device is in sleep mode 
divided by the interval of transmission.   
 
RxTotal =  RxDelay1  +  Rx1  +  RxDelay2  +  Rx2                                  (1) 
ATotal  =  TxTotal  +  RxTotal                                                 (2) 
RA =  ATotal  ÷  I                                                           (3) 
RS   =  STotal  ÷  I                                                           (4) 
 
Equation 5 below results in calculating the average current during the active mode 
of the device, particularly the wake and transmit, and receive states. This equation 
requires the average current during wake and transmission, and the time the device takes 
in that state. Next, the equation requires the average current during the receive delay state 
and the time the state occurs. Next, the equation requires the average current during the 
receiving state and the time the device is in that state. Next, the equation requires the 
Second receive delay average current and the time it takes for that to occur. Next, the 
second receive state average current and the time it takes to receive are required. Finally, 
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this is all divided by the total time in active mode to get the entire activated state’s 
average current draw. 
Equation 6 below results in the calculation of the average current. The Average 
Current requires the ratio of time the device is active and the average active current. The 
average current calculation also involves the ratio of time the device is asleep, and the 
average sleep current measured by the power monitor as a constant. 
 
ACActive  = ((ACTx × TxTotal )  +  (ACRx1Delay × RxDelay1 )  + (ACRx1 × Rx1) +                    (5)                                   
(ACRx2Delay  ×  RxDelay2) + (ACRx2 ×  Rx2))  ÷ ATotal           (5 cont.) 
                                    DC  =  ( RA × ACActive ) + ( RS × ACSleep )                               (6) 
 
Once the average current overtime is calculated, the total amount of hours the 
device is estimated to be in operation can be calculated. The battery capacity in mAh is 
required as well as the Average device consumption in mA. Equation 7 below is used to 
estimate how long a battery will last. The estimate is based on the average current that a 
load is drawing from it and the nominal battery capacity. Most battery capacity figures 
are in milliamp-hours (mAh) or Amp-hours (Ah). Equation 7 below assumes a nominal 
battery capacity is the total amount of energy that can be withdrawn from a battery at a 
fully charged state at a particular current.   




Table 13 below contains the power data and battery life equation parameters. This 
table outlines the parameters used for the average current for various modes of operation 
and their time. Some parameters are used for the calculation of OTAA when it comes to 
Join Scheduling.  
 
Table 13 
Power Data and Battery Life Equation Parameters 
Variable Description 
ATotal Total Time in Active mode 
STotal Time in Sleep Duration 
I Interval of Data Transmission in hours 
JSrate Interval of OTAA in hours 
TTotal Total Time per Period 
TNo OTAA Total time without OTAA 
TOTAA Total time in OTAA mode 
ACActive Average Current during Active Mode 
CACOTAA Average Current draw during OTAA 
ACSleep Average Current draw during Sleep Mode 
ACTotal Average Total current draw 
TSleep Total Seconds in Sleep mode before OTAA 
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Table 13 (continued) 
Variable Description 
RNormal The ratio of Total Time under Normal Operation 
ROTAA The ratio of Total Time impacted by OTAA 
ATotal Total Time in Active mode 
DCTotal Average Total Device Current 
DCNormal Average Device Current during normal operation 
DCOTAA Average Device Current during OTAA 
 
 
The purposes of the following equations are to calculate the effect OTAA has on a 
schedule. To calculate the average current consumption of a device, the required 
equations are provided below. Equation 8 calculates the total time interval between data 
transmissions using the total time the device is active and the total time the device is in a 
sleep state. Equation 9 calculates the total time in minutes per period. Equation 10 
calculates the total time where the device does not have a period that contains OTAA. 
Equation 11 calculates the ratio of time between the device not transmitting over the total 
period. Equation 12 calculates the ratio of time impacted by OTAA by dividing the 
interval by the total time per period. Equation 13 calculates the average current draw 
during the period where OTAA occurs with sleep states, wake, and transmit states, and 
OTAA states over the transmission interval. Equation 14 calculates the average device 
current with the ratio of time impacted by OTAA. Equation 15 calculates the average 
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device current during normal operation using the current during the normal operation and 
the ratio of the time during normal operation. Equation 16 factors in both the normal time 
and the time where OTAA occurs to get the average device current. This action factors in 
the OTAA scheme and the rate of normal transmissions at specific intervals. 
 𝐼 = ATotal + STotal                                                                               (8) 
TTotal  = JSrate                                                    (9) 
                                                       TNo OTAA = TTotal –  𝐼                                                (10) 
                                                   RNormal = TNo OTAA ÷ TTotal                                                   (11) 
                                                        ROTAA = I ÷ TTotal                                                                             (12) 
    ACOTAA =  (( TSleep × ACSleep )  +  (  TOTAA × ACOTAA )  +  ( ATotal × DC )) ÷ 𝐼         (13) 
DCOTAA = CACOTAA × ROTAA                                                                (14) 
  DCNormal = ACActive × RNormal                                                            (15) 
DCTotal = DCOTAA  +  DCNormal                                                          (16)                                                                     
 
7.2 Battery Life with Round Reduction 
Table 14 below contains the number of days the node will be operational when 
implementing the proposed Round Reduction method, based on the battery life 
calculations above. A lower sleep time means that the data is sent more frequently, 
resulting in diminished battery life. Round Reduction adds a few days of battery life 
when sleep time is low (data sent more regularly). Less data is sent, so more days are 
saved when round reduction is utilized. Round Reduction has a lower impact when sleep 
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Table 14  
LoRaWAN Shield with Sketch w/ Normal Transmissions & Reduced Rounds 
Sleep Time Days 10R Days 9R Days 8R 
15 sec 43.74 44.48 45.20 
30 sec 80.48 81.73 82.95 
60 sec  138.75 140.61 142.41 
300 sec 329.79 331.87 333.86 
.25 hr 427.99 429.16 430.27 
.5 hr 462.42 463.10 463.74 
1 hr 481.80 482.16 482.51 
12 hr 501.04 501.08 501.11 
24 hr 501.95 501.97 501.99 
 
 
7.3 Battery Life with Metadata Hiding 
Table 15 below contains the number of days the node will be operational when 
implementing the proposed Metadata Hiding method, based on the battery life 
calculations above. Reduced Rounds combined with Metadata Hiding is also included in 
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the data set, and as the rounds decrease, the battery life increases. Inherently, a lower 
sleep time means that the data is sent more frequently, resulting in diminished battery 
life. There is more overhead with round reduction, and the full impact can be seen 
compared to other methods. Like Round Reduction, Metadata Hiding has a lower effect 
when sleep times are over an hour. The idle current draw has a more considerable impact 
than transmissions. 
 
Table 15  
LoRaWAN Shield with Sketch w/ Metadata Hiding & Reduced Rounds 
Sleep Time Days 10R Days 9R Days 8R 
15 sec 42.61 42.80 43.32 
30 sec 78.57 78.88 79.78 
60 sec  135.91 136.38 137.71 
300 sec 326.54 327.08 328.61 
.25 hr 426.16 426.47 427.33 
.5 hr 461.35 461.53 462.03 
1 hr 481.21 481.31 481.59 
12 hr 497.27 497.30 497.37 





7.4 Battery Life with Join Scheduling 
Table 16 below contains the number of days the node will be operational when 
implementing the proposed Join Scheduling method, based on the battery life calculations 
above. Reduced Rounds combined with Join Scheduling power data is also included in 
the data set, and as the rounds decrease, the battery life increases. The rate at which the 
OTAA operation is done in twenty-four hours. Like before, a lower sleep time means that 
the data is sent more frequently, resulting in diminished battery life. There is more 
overhead with OTAA. Like Round Reduction and Metadata Hiding, OTAA has a lower 
effect when sleep times are over an hour.   
 
Table 16  
LoRaWAN Shield with Sketch w/ Join Scheduling & Reduced Rounds 
Sleep Time Days 10R + OTAA Days 9R + OTAA Days 8R + OTAA 
15 sec 43.72 44.46 45.18 
30 sec 80.42 81.67 82.89 
60 sec  138.57 140.42 142.23 
300 sec 328.76 330.84 332.85 
.25 hr. 426.27 427.45 428.58 
.5 hr. 460.40 461.11 461.78 
1 hr. 479.61 480.01 480.39 
12 hr. 498.68 498.75 498.81 
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24 hr. 499.58 499.63 499.69 
  
Table 17 below shows the increase of average current consumption when join 
scheduling is considered. The values here can be used with the equations to calculate 
battery life. More frequent usage of OTAA will reduce battery life. Less frequent usage 
of OTAA will have a battery life comparable to the battery life of regular transmissions.  
 
Table 17 
Increase in Average Current Consumption with Join Scheduling 
AES Rounds 24 Hours 12 Hours 6 Hours 1 Hour 
10 0.001821 0.003642 0.007284 0.043709 
9 0.001359 0.002719 0.005438 0.032632 
8 0.001337 0.002675 0.005350 0.032101 
 
 
7.5 Battery Life Cumulative Analysis 
 Table 18 below contains the number of days the node will be operational when 
considering Round Reduction and Metadata Hiding combined with Round Reduction. 
The results prove that eight rounds are the most efficient way to transfer packets to save 
battery life. Using ten rounds is a safe bet, yet adding metadata hiding and reducing the 
rounds to eight rounds has similar battery life. The most resource-intensive but most 
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secure version is ten rounds and metadata hiding. Table 19 below contains the number of 
days the node will be operational when considering Round Reduction and Join 
Scheduling. Rounds Reduction saves battery life when using eight rounds with OTAA at 
a 24-hour schedule compared to ten rounds with OTAA. OTAA adds some overhead, yet 
it is worth it if metadata hiding is not used. 
Table 18 
Cumulative Analysis - Reduced Rounds vs. Metadata Hiding 












60 sec 142.41 140.61 138.75 137.71 136.38 135.91 
30 min 463.74 463.10 462.42 462.03 461.53 461.35 
1 hr. 482.51 482.16 481.80 481.59 481.31 481.21 
12 hr. 501.11 501.08 501.04 497.37 497.30 497.27 
24 hr. 501.99 501.97 501.95 501.02 501.00 500.99 
 
Table 19 















60 sec 142.41 142.23 140.61 140.42 138.75 138.57 
30 min 463.74 461.78 463.10 461.11 462.42 460.40 
1 hr. 482.51 480.39 482.16 480.01 481.80 479.61 
12 hr. 501.11 498.81 501.08 498.75 501.04 498.68 
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Conclusion and Future Work 
8.1 Conclusion 
 The most considerable power-efficiency improvements come from using Round 
Reduction when more frequent transmissions occur. As the data transmissions are spaced 
out, the power draw is more affected by the sleep state power draw than the savings 
during the less frequent transmissions. The most considerable security improvements are 
met with Metadata hiding. Join Scheduling should be implemented to every node when a 
network of devices is being provisioned. 
This work introduces the concepts of Rounds Reduction, Join Scheduling, and 
Metadata Hiding for LoRaWAN networks. The final results of the experiments are as 
follows: 
1. Use 8 Rounds & Join Scheduling if a concern is Metadata Collection and 
long-term power expenditure. 
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2. Use 8 Rounds & Metadata Hiding if you care about Metadata Collection 
and want to keep battery life close to that of a standard transmission with 
ten rounds. 
3. Use 10 Rounds & Metadata Hiding if you care about Metadata 
Collection and do not care about the battery life lost with the 
computational overhead. 
 
In Figure XX below, the flowchart details what decisions to make when 
considering the methods proposed. 
 
 




Though LoRaWAN is secure by design, many various vulnerabilities are inherent 
to the design. Some vulnerabilities are difficult to solve, such as the physical security of 
the keys. Some vulnerabilities can be mitigated with features inherent to the LoRaWAN 
protocol, such as OTAA or public fields. Modification to the source code of LoRaWAN 
and the ability to test real-world sensor nodes is critical to quantify the security vs. 
battery life of LoRaWAN nodes. 
8.2  Future Work 
 The use of a cryptographic coprocessor, as described in Chapter 3, would add 
much needed physical security to the end nodes. An external cryptographic coprocessor 
would require pre-installed keys, and the data would need to be encrypted on the 
coprocessor and the generation of the message integrity code. Though it is easier to test 
with existing hardware by using an external cryptographic coprocessor, there is an 
inherent sleep state power draw when using the external cryptographic coprocessor. 
Additionally, there are many different modifications needed to the LMIC source code to 
ensure the encryption can occur on the external cryptographic coprocessor rather than the 
node itself.  
 Testing the optimization methods on Class B or Class C devices, mentioned in 
Chapter 2, is a useful endeavor. This idea will extend the security and power benefits to 
more resource-intensive device classes. There may be more considerable benefits of the 
schemes when using Class B and Class C devices.  
 Future-proofing LoRaWAN and discovering the overhead involved when 
switching from AES-128 to AES-192 or AES-256 is a useful concept. Eventually, AES-
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128 will be deprecated and no longer safe to use; it will help replace the current 
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